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Motivation
I Matching markets: university admissions, entry-level labor
markets, kidney exchange, school choice, . . .
I Market design
I Stability
I Assignment of medical graduates to residency programs in the
US. Many rural hospitals complained that
C1. they had difficulties to fill their posts; and
C2. the posts they did fill were mainly staffed by graduates of
foreign medical schools.
I Question: can the distribution of medical graduates over
residency programs be altered by using a different stable
mechanism?
I Answer: no. The maldistribution is not an artifact of the
employed stable mechanism (Roth, 1986).
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Preference Domains
I Responsiveness
I Substitutability
I Cardinal Monotonicity
I Separability
I Weak Separability
I Quota Filling
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Existence of Stable Matchings
Theorem [Roth, 1984]: P substitutable =⇒ Σ(P) 6= ∅.
Example: violation of R1 (Mart´ınez et al., 2000)
Pf1 Pf2 Pf3 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3 Pw4
w3 w1w2 w4 f1 f1 f2 f2
w1w3 w1w3 ∅ f2 f2 f1 f3
w2w3 w1w4 · · · ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
w1w2 w2w3 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
w1 w2w4
w2 w3w4
∅ w1
· · · w2
w3
w4
∅
· · ·
Preferences are substitutable but R1 does not hold:
Clearly, µ = (w3,w1w2,w4) and µ
′ = (w1w2,w3w4, ∅)
are stable matchings, but |µ(f3)| = 1 6= 0 = |µ′(f3)|.
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Separability (Mart´ınez et al., 2000)
S S
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For each S ⊆W with |S | < qf and Ch(S,Pf) = S
and each w ∈W \S ,∪{∅},
Weak Separability (Klijn and Yazıcı, 2013)
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Quota Filling (Alkan, 2001)
The definition is in two parts:
QF1. Let kf ≡ max{ |Ch(S ,Pf )| : S ⊆W }. For each S ⊆W ,
|S | ≥ kf =⇒ |Ch(S ,Pf )| = kf .
QF2. Pf substitutable.
Inclusion Relations among Preference Domains
7 8
substitutable
651 2
3
4
9
10
11 12 13
separable
quota
filling
responsive
weakly
separable
cardinally
monotonic
Rural Hospital Theorem
(Recall: Σ(P) denotes the set of stable matchings at P.)
I R1. For each pair µ, µ′ ∈ Σ(P) and each a ∈ F ∪W ,
|µ(a)| = |µ′(a)|;
I R2. For each pair µ, µ′ ∈ Σ(P) and each a ∈ F ∪W ,
|µ(a)| < qa =⇒ µ(a) = µ′(a).
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Results, Part II:
Maximality of Domains for Rural Hospital Theorem
Definition of Maximality
Let D be a subdomain of the domain of substitutable preferences.
D is maximal for property R if
I [ for all a ∈ F ∪W , Pa ∈ D ] ⇒ property R holds at P;
and
I [ a∗ ∈ F ∪W and Pa∗ 6∈ D ] ⇒ there is P−a∗ such that for all
a ∈ (F ∪W )\a∗, Pa ∈ D, and property R does not hold at P.
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given to us we can construct︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pf1 Pf2 . . . Pwm
...
... . . .
...
...
... . . .
...
subs. + subs. + subs. + subs. +
not weakly sep. weakly sep. weakly sep. weakly sep.
such that R2 does not hold at P.
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yet, our maximality results suggest its impact is rather limited.
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1. {w1,w2}, {w3,w4}, {w1,w3}, {w1,w4}, {w2,w3}, {w2,w4},
{w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, ∅.
2. {w1,w2}, {w1,w3}, {w1,w4}, {w2,w3}, {w3,w4}, {w2,w4},
{w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, ∅ and there is at least one other worker, say w5.
3. {w1,w2}, {w1}, {w2}, ∅, {w1,w2,w3}, {w1,w3}, {w2,w3}, {w3}
and there are no other workers.
4. {w1,w2}, {w1}, {w2}, ∅
and there are no other workers.
5. {w1,w2}, {w1,w3}, {w2,w3}, {w1,w4}, {w2,w4}, {w3,w4},
{w2}, {w3}, {w4}, {w1}, ∅ and there are no other workers.
6. {w1}, {w1,w2}, {w2}, ∅
and there are no other workers.
7. {w1,w4}, {w2,w3,w4}, {w4}, ∅.
8. {w1,w2,w3,w4}, {w1}, {w1,w2,w3}, ∅.
9. {w2,w3,w4}, {w1,w4}, {w2}, {w4}, ∅.
10. {w1,w2}, {w1}, {w1,w3}, {w1,w2,w3}, {w2}, ∅.
11. {w1,w3}, {w1,w2,w3}, {w2,w3}, {w1}, {w3}, {w2}, ∅, {w1,w2}.
12. {w1}, {w2,w4}, {w2,w3}, {w4}, {w3}, {w2}, ∅.
13. {w1,w4}, {w2,w3,w4}, {w2}, {w4}, ∅.
Example of 10 : substitutable and weakly separable,
but not separable
Pf
w1w2
w1
w1w3
w1w2w3
w2
∅
· · ·
I qf = 3
I Pf substitutable
I Pf weakly separable
I Pf not separable since w2 Pf ∅ but w1w3 Pf w1w2w3
Example of 6 : quota filling, but not weakly separable
Pf
w1
w1w2
w2
∅
I kf = 1, qf = 2
I Pf quota filling since
|Ch(w1,Pf )| = |Ch(w1w2,Pf )| = |Ch(w2,Pf )| = 1
I Pf not weakly separable since
|{w1}| < qf , Ch(w1,Pf ) = w1, and w2 Pf ∅,
but w1 Pf w1w2
Existence of Stable Matchings
Theorem [Roth, 1984]: P substitutable =⇒ Σ(P) 6= ∅.
Proof: Using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) Deferred Acceptance
algorithm:
1.a. Each firm proposes to its choice set from the set of all workers.
1.b. Each worker accepts tentatively its choice set from the set of
firms that propose to him/her. Other proposals are rejected.
...
k .a. Each firm proposes to its choice set from the set of workers
that have not rejected it yet.
k .b. Each worker accepts tentatively its choice set from the set of
firms that propose to him/her. Other proposals are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no more rejections are issued.
The tentative matching becomes final and is stable. 
Example: violation of R2 (Kojima, 2012)
Pf1 Pf2 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3
w1w3 w1w2 f 2 f1 f2
w1w2 w1w3 ∅ f2 f1
w1 w2w3 · · · ∅ ∅
w3 w1 · · · · · ·
w2 w2
∅ w3
· · · ∅
· · ·
Preferences are substitutable but R2 does not hold:
µ = (w3,w1w2) and µ
′ = (w2,w1w3) are stable matchings
with |µ(f1)| = |µ′(f1)| = 1 < 2 = qf1 and µ(f1) 6= µ′(f1).
